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INTRODUCTION
What should be done about climate change? The debate is notoriously
complex, involving a mix of difficult and uncertain science, the potential re-
structuring of the energy, agricultural, and forestry sectors across the globe, as
well as issues of national sovereignty, distributive justice, corrective justice, and
development. Specialists intensely disagree about the central issues-the types
of policies that are best, the level of resources to be devoted to the problem, and
which nations should pay.' Many of these disagreements are beginning to play a
role in domestic law,2 and they may well arise in the context of judicial interpre-
tation of many environmental statutes.
When readers pick up two of the most prominent recent books on these
topics, one by Sir Nicholas Stern written for the UK government, and one by
American economist William Nordhaus, they find dramatically different rec-
ommendations.3 Stern argues for an immediate and dramatic response, with a
very high carbon tax imposed immediately and increasing rapidly over time.
The issue, according to Stern, is urgent. Nordhaus also favors an international
agreement, but he recommends modest and slow changes. In his view, rapid
changes impose costs that are far too large relative to the benefits, and he pre-
fers a slow but steady change in the energy supply system. As a result, Nordhaus
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1. A good overview can be found in JOHN HOUGHTON, GLOBAL WARMING: THE
COMPLETE BRIEFING (3d ed. 2004).
2. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLI-
MATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007). Partha Dasgupta offers a similar
comparison of the Stern and Nordhaus contributions. Partha Dasgupta, Discount-
ing Climate Change, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 143 (2008).
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argues in favor of a relatively low carbon tax. What is the policy analyst to con-
clude? What accounts for these differences? These questions will ultimately bear
on both domestic and international choices; they might also be litigated in fed-
eral court.
4
Both authors, it turns out, make the same basic assumptions about the ef-
fects of climate change, about the structure of economic systems, and about
most other parameters that might affect the debate.' The major difference is one
that at first seems entirely technical: The proper computation of the discount
rate, which, as we will discuss, is simply the rate one uses to match cash flows in
different periods. Stern argues for a low discount rate, while Nordhaus argues
for a high one. Both authors recognize this difference as the major reason for
their radically disparate recommendations. The resulting debates about the
proper method of discounting have been heated, with Stern finally accusing
Nordhaus and others of plain ignorance.6 It is clear that decisions about the
proper response to climate change will turn, in significant part, on resolution of
this debate.
In this Essay, we explore the issue of discounting in the context of climate
change. The central problem is that if the world cuts emissions immediately, the
beneficiaries of its action will be people living decades from now, not people liv-
ing today. By contrast, the costs of emissions reductions will be paid mostly by
current generations. At the core of the climate change problem, then, is an ethi-
cal debate involving the allocation of resources across generations. Defenders of
4. The appropriate discount rate has become an issue in several cases. For a slightly
dated but helpful overview, see Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of
Discount Rates Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333 (1998).
5. The major difference between the two models, other than the discount rate, is
Stern's greater attention to worst-case scenarios and risk. Nordhaus conducts sen-
sitivity analyses in his model to obtain a sense of how changes in parameters affect
the results, but he does not incorporate risk in any systematic way. Stern's model
incorporates risk more robustly. Stern also applies discounting in a nonstandard
(and impossible to justify) way; he discounts the costs of reducing emissions over
the next fifty years but discounts the benefits over several hundred years. See, e.g.,
John P. Weyant, A Critique of the Stern Review's Mitigation Cost Analyses and In-
tegrated Assessment, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 77 (2008) (discussing Stern's
calculations of the costs of reducing emissions). We focus here on the disagree-
ment over discount rates and ignore Stern's unusual application of discounting. A
final important difference between Stern and Nordhaus is that Stern, at the end of
the day, abandons economic analysis in favor of the intuition that concentrations
of carbon dioxide over 550 parts per million impose an excessive risk on human-
ity. Nordhaus maintains a consistent economic analysis throughout his model.
6. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 12 (2008).
Nordhaus and others have responded to Stern's claims in the academic literature.
See William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Cli-
mate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686 (2007); Martin L. Weitzman, A Review
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discounting argue that it is necessary to ensure consistent comparisons of re-
sources spent in different time periods. Critics of discounting begin with a prin-
ciple of intergenerational neutrality. They insist that people in the current gen-
eration should not be treated as more valuable than people in the next
generation. In short, they object that discounting ensures that future genera-
tions will receive less attention, and perhaps far less attention, than those now
living.
Discounting has generated a massive literature with strong views on various
sides of the issue.7 Although there are many subtleties and complexities in these
arguments, we break down the basic positions into two camps: the positivists
7. For a small sampling, see THOMAS STERNER & U. MARTIN PERSSON, AN EVEN
STERNER REVIEW: INTRODUCING RELATIVE PRICES INTO THE DISCOUNTING DE-
BATE (2007); Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming, in DISCOUNT-
ING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 13 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds.,
1999); Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting and Public Investment Criteria, in WATER
RESEARCH 13 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds., 1966) [hereinafter Arrow,
Discounting and Public Investment Criteria]; K.J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Eq-
uity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 125 (James P. Bruce et al. eds.,
1996) [hereinafter Arrow, Intertemporal Equity]; John Broome, Discounting the
Future, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 128 (1994); Partha Dasgupta et al., Intergenerational
Equity, Social Discount Rates, and Global Warming, in DISCOUNTING AND INTER-
GENERATIONAL EQUITY, supra, at 51; Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the
Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007) [hereinafter Heal, Discounting];
Geoffrey Heal, Intertemporal Welfare Economics and the Environment, in 3 THE
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1106 (Karl-G6ran Maler & Jeffrey R.
Vincent eds., 2005) [hereinafter Heal, Intertemporal Welfare Economics and the
Environment]; Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenera-
tional Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79 (2007); Robert C.
Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Discounting, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGEN-
ERATIONAL EQUITY, supra, at 173; Robert C. Lind, Intergenerational Equity, Dis-
counting, and the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Evaluating Global Climate Policy,
23 ENERGY POL'Y 379 (1995); Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues Relating
to the Discount Rate for Evaluating National Energy Options, in DISCOUNTING FOR
TIME AND RISK IN ENERGY POLICY 21 (Robert C. Lind ed., 1982) [hereinafter Lind,
A Primer on the Major Issues]; Nordhaus, supra note 6; Ar Rabl, Discounting of
Long-Term Costs: What Would Future Generations Prefer Us To Do?, 17 ECOLOGI-
CAL ECON. 137 (1996); Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenera-
tional Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 145 (2007); Thomas C. Schelling, Intergen-
erational and International Discounting, 2o RISK ANALYSIS 833 (2000); Thomas C.
Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, 23 ENERGY POL'Y 395 (1995); Cass R. Sun-
stein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Inter-
generational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007); Weitzman, supra note 6; Martin
L. Weitzman, Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest Pos-
sible Rate, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 201 (1998) [hereinafter Weitzman, Lowest
Possible Rate].
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and the ethicists.' The positivists generally defend discounting at the market
rate of return on the theory that only by evaluating projects at the market rate
can we ensure the projects are worthwhile. If a project produces less than the
market rate of return, there is a better return available by simply investing in the
market. We should not, argue the positivists, invest in a project (such as reduc-
ing carbon emissions) unless the returns are as good as opportunities available
elsewhere. The positivist argument is of course acceptable only if it can be justi-
fied in ethical terms; positivists argue that it can be so justified.
The ethicists respond that the positivist approach is morally indefensible
and unjust, because it grossly undervalues the future in violation of a principle
of intergenerational neutrality. In particular, it is easy to show that using any
modest level of discounting, future generations count for essentially nothing.
The destruction of Florida through sea level rise in 200 years, for example, turns
out to matter very little in a cost-benefit analysis that relies on discounting. This
cannot be correct and, at its most fundamental level, violates the principle of
intergenerational neutrality by treating the welfare of people who live in the fu-
ture as far less important than the welfare of people who live in the present.
Our more modest goal is to explain exactly what separates the two sides-
to provide a kind of primer, or consumers' guide, for an unusually complex dis-
agreement. Our more ambitious aim is to sort out the competing arguments.
We argue that the two sides are addressing essentially different issues. The ethi-
cists are concerned about the overall distribution of welfare and resources
across generations. They are correct to insist that the consequences of climate
change raise important distributional issues and that future generations are at
serious risk in a way that might violate the ethical obligations of the current
generation. Given present understandings of the likelihood of bad or even
catastrophic effects from climate change, 9 those who are now living need to ad-
dress whether they are imposing excessive risks on their descendents. We also
agree, and will show, that cost-benefit analysis with discounting can produce
outcomes that are not easy to defend.
We will argue, however, that this concern about intergenerational justice is
separate from the issue addressed by the positivists.10 Positivists are considering
8. To our knowledge, these terms are our own. A chapter of the 1996 Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on climate change uses similar
terms, referring to the basic positions as descriptive and prescriptive. Arrow, In-
tertemporal Equity, supra note 7, at 131-33; see also Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 7,
at 177-78 (explaining descriptive and prescriptive approaches).
9. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Structure Uncertainty and the Value of Statistical
Life in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 07-11, 2007), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1196.
1o. We and others have defended this position in previously published articles. See,
e.g., Kaplow, supra note 7, at 79 ("[QIuestions of intergenerational distributive
justice and of intergenerational efficiency are substantially distinct in principle.");
Samida & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 145 ("[Dliscounting future costs and benefits
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the choice of projects for any given decision about how much each generation
should get, but they do not address at all the amount each generation should
receive. That is, the ethicists are concerned with distribution, and the positivists
are concerned with efficiency. Because we can redistribute across generations
not merely through emissions reductions, but in many other ways, (e.g., simply
saving more) these two concerns can be separated. The best way for the current
generation to help posterity might be through reducing emissions; however, it
might be through other methods, including approaches that make posterity
richer and better able to adapt.1
To illustrate, suppose that the ethicists convince us that the consequences
of climate change are such that far more needs to be done for and left to the fu-
ture. If we thought our legacy was appropriate before learning about the effects
of climate change, an understanding of climate change means that we need to
adjust that view. If we need to leave more to the future, however, the positivists
are correct to point out that we should choose projects by evaluating them at
the rate of return otherwise available: the market rate of return. Because we can
always invest at the market rate rather than in the project being evaluated, any
decision to save for the future by investing in a lower-return project wastes re-
sources. To be sure, if we save more for the future, the market rate of return will
decrease, so there is an interaction between the two effects. But as we begin the
project of saving more for the future, each project needs to be evaluated at the
market rate of return at that time.
Although we recommend discounting at the market rate of return when
evaluating climate change policy, we accept the principle of intergenerational
neutrality.'2 In particular, we agree that if cost-benefit analysis with discounting
imposes serious harms on members of future generations, then there is indeed a
serious ethical problem. The solution is not, however, to refuse to discount. It is
to adjust overall savings and investment rates. As we shall also show, a refusal to
discount can, under reasonable assumptions, harm rather than help members
of future generations by depriving them of the benefits of current investments.
Our conclusion, then, is that discounting is appropriate and ethically justified.
of projects does not undervalue future generations."); Sunstein & Rowell, supra
note 7, at 198 ("A refusal to discount, often justified as a way of assisting the fu-
ture, is a singularly crude way of attempting to fulfill our obligations to future
generations.") (footnote omitted). In this Essay, we aim to defend the position
further and to address the concerns of various ethicists with whose arguments we
have not previously dealt. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 3, at 46-51; Heal, Discount-
ing, supra note 7.
11. We express no views here on the underlying merits of various policies, such as
whether the return on investments in emissions reduction is higher or lower than
the return on alternative investments. The discussion in the text is merely illustra-
tive.
12. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999) (offering one understanding
and defense of the principle of intergenerational neutrality); CAss R. SUNSTEIN,
WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007) (presenting applications to risk regulation).
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Moreover, when cost-benefit analysis with discounting produces indefensible
results, the response should be, not to refuse to discount, but to take more di-
rect steps to help members of future generations.
In short, the defenders and critics of discounting are simply talking past
one another, and careful examination of their views show that their positions
are not inconsistent. Instead, each emphasizes different aspects of the problem.
One of our goals here is to show where, and when, those different aspects de-
serve attention.
Part I reviews the basic mathematics of discounting and explores why it
makes sense in the normal context of a person making investment decisions.
Part II considers the arguments for and against extending this logic to the inter-
generational context presented by climate change. Part III discusses our pro-
posed resolution of the problem. Part III also considers objections, including
the argument that discounting entails valuing lives or the welfare of individuals
living in the future differently. We show that this argument confuses the valua-
tion of lives with the problem of discounting; we argue for discounting money,
not lives.
I. WHY DISCOUNT?
In this Part, we outline the basic fundamentals of discounting as they might
be applied to an individual's allocation decisions as well as generations making
distributional choices over longer time horizons.
A. The Basic Problem
The basic problem addressed by discounting is that the costs and benefits of
spending resources to reduce the effects of climate change occur at different
times. To prevent significant harms, we must begin spending sizable resources
in the near future. The benefits of these expenditures, however, will be enjoyed
over the next several hundred years in the form of reduced effects from climate
change. This is due to two factors." The first is that carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases have very long lives in the atmosphere. 4 Emissions today will
increase concentrations of greenhouse gases long into the future. They cannot
13. For a helpful summary, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND
RESPONSE (2004).
14. The lifetime of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, unfortunately, is not well de-
fined because it depends on the availability of land and ocean sinks. See INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
824-25 (2007). According to the IPCC, under current conditions, "more than half
of the CO. emitted is currently removed from the atmosphere within a century."
About 20%, though, "remains in the atmosphere for many millennia." Id. at 824.
The rate of removal will slow as land and ocean sinks are depleted.
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be undone with any currently available or foreseeable technology. The second is
that the climate system has significant inertia. It takes a substantial period of
time before the effects of emissions are felt. This means that, even if the world
were to cease emitting greenhouse gases immediately, prior emissions would
continue to have an effect on the climate in the future. Similarly, current and
future emissions will have effects over long periods of time. In short, emissions
of greenhouse gases today hurt future people. Correspondingly, reductions in
emissions today help future generations through reduced fluctuations in the
climate. Different people, living hundreds of years apart, will pay the costs and
receive the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
For short-term projects where the costs and benefits occur in different but
relatively proximate periods, it is standard to discount the costs and benefits to
a single period. Suppose that one has $1oo and is presented with a sioo invest-
ment that will produce siio in two years. She can choose to spend the soo to-
day or make the investment and spend silo in two years. The individual should
not simply choose $11o on the ground that $11o is larger than $1oo. Instead, she
should use discounting to compare the two choices.
To see why, suppose that the individual has an alternative choice: putting
the money in a bank account, which will pay interest at 6%. If she places the
$100 in the bank instead of making the investment, she would have $112.36 after
two years. Therefore, she should not make the investment. Doing so would
leave her worse off than the alternative. An equivalent procedure for making
this comparison is to discount the investment returns by the interest rate. If the
discounted flow is more than $ioo, the investment makes sense and if not, it
does not. To discount, simply divide each cash flow by (i + r)" where r is the in-
terest rate and n is the number of years. Here, the present value of $11o when the
interest rate is 6% is about $98 ($11o/1.o62 = $97.90), which is less than $1oo.
Discounting is best seen as a way of taking opportunity costs into account.
The opportunity cost of making the investment in this example was the alterna-
tive return available by putting the money in the bank. Using our numbers, the
opportunity cost was higher than the return on the investment. If the bank paid
interest at 4%, however, the opportunity cost would be lower, and, in this case,
the investment would make sense ($11o/1.042 = $101.70).
Central to this analysis is the fact that alternative means of shifting re-
sources across time existed-in our example, a bank account. With the bank
account, the individual could choose $1oo today or $112.12 in two years, but in
no event should she choose $11o in two years. If she were Robinson Crusoe and
had no other investment choice, that is, no way of shifting resources across time
periods by borrowing or saving, the opportunity cost of the investment would
be zero, and the decision would be between $11o in two years and $1oo today.
She might still prefer $1oo today because she has to eat, but she would no longer
look to the opportunity cost to decide. We will return to this point at the end of
the Essay. The ethicists are, in a sense, claiming that the world is like Robinson
Crusoe's with respect to climate change: We have to decide how much to have
in each period without reference to opportunity costs. The positivists claim that
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we have the option of the market, so we must take opportunity costs into ac-
count.
B. Future Generations and the Arc of Time
One key question is whether this same logic can be applied over very long
time periods (perhaps 200 years or more), especially when the costs and bene-
fits are spread across generations rather than a single individual. Discounting,
then, is no longer simply about an individual spreading consumption over her
lifetime. Instead, it is about comparing the welfare of different individuals. Does
the same logic apply?
It is clear that discounting can have profound effects on policy choices that
have long time horizons. For example, suppose that as a result of climate
change, we face losing si trillion in ioo years. If the discount rate is 7%, we
would be willing to spend only a little over si billion-one one-thousandth of
the damages-to prevent that harm! If the time horizon were 200 years-a span
well within climate change policy considerations-at a 7% discount rate, we
would be willing to spend only about $1.3 million, or 0.00013% of the future
cost, to prevent it. Using these numbers, it is easy to construct examples where
it is not desirable to spend a small amount of money today to save some valu-
able asset or large number of people in the future. On ethical grounds, many
people are skeptical about the conclusions seemingly required by discounting
the future benefits of reductions in climate change.
We have noted that, because of the potentially profound effect of discount
rates, these figures are central to major disagreements over climate change pol-
icy. As we have also noted, almost the entire difference between the influential
recommendations of Stern and Nordhaus is driven by the discount rate
assumptions used by the authors.15 Stern discounted future costs and benefits at
1.4%,16 while Nordhaus discounted them at 5.5%.17 A 1.4% discount rate would
value a cost in loo years almost 53 times as highly as would a 5.5% discount rate.
If the harm occurs in 200 years, the Stern approach would value it almost 2,800
times as much as the Nordhaus approach. If most of the costs of climate change
occur in the distant future, the discounting assumption would lead Stern to
view climate change as a far more critical problem than Nordhaus does. To
confirm that this was the primary difference in the two approaches, Nordhaus
ran his computer model using Stern's discount rate. The results with this
change echoed Stern's recommendations. To an approximation, discount rates
were all that separated the authors' positions. 8
15. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
16. NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 178.
17. Id. at 61.
18. See id. at 165-91; see also Chris Hope, The Marginal Impact of COfrom PAGE2002:
An Integrated Assessment Model Incorporating the IPCC's Five Reasons for Concern,
6 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 19 (2006).
440
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While we highlight these two recent books as examples, analysts have long
recognized that discount rates are among the central parameters in evaluating
the effects of climate change and that the decision about the appropriate re-
sponse depends on resolving the debate. The Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC), for example, estimates that discount rates are the second
most important factor in evaluating the effects of climate change. The IPCC
rates the effect of climate sensitivity (the average global temperature change due
to a doubling of the concentration of CO. in the atmosphere) as the most im-
portant factor. If this factor is scaled at ioo, discounting would have a value of
66, while estimates of the valuation of the economic impact from a 2.5 degree
increase in temperature are valued at 32.'9
The debate on discounting began long before climate change was an issue.
In 1928, Frank Ramsey famously argued that "it is assumed that we do not dis-
count later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is
ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagina-
tion."2 ° Roy Harrod argued that discounting is "a polite expression for rapacity
and the conquest of reason by passion."2' Nobel laureate Tjalling Koopmans ar-
gued, however, that a failure to discount effectively means that the current gen-
eration must starve itself to benefit the future.22 Suppose that, in ethical terms,
we must act to maximize total welfare and that a dollar invested grows at a posi-
tive rate for the indefinite future. If we do not discount, the future gains from
the investment dollar will also be worth infinitely more than the present loss.
Therefore, not discounting means that we must save every dollar, an indefensi-
ble conclusion. Numerous other authors have studied the issue over the years.23
II. ETHICISTS AND POSITIVISTS
There are two major positions with respect to the proper discount rate,
which we described earlier as the ethicists' and the positivists' approaches.2 4 The
ethicists attempt to reason from first principles about what the discount rate
should be. The positivists attempt to observe what the market-determined dis-
count rate actually is. If the market rate does not coincide with what the ethi-
cists think it should be, the two positions will conflict. We begin by describing
19. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 823 (2007).
20. Frank P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 EcON. J. 543 (1928).
21. Roy F. HARROD, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC ECONOMICS 40 (1948).
22. Tjalling C. Koopmans, On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth, 28 PONTIFI-
CIAE ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM SCRIPTA VARIA 225, 252-53 (1965).
23. See supra note 7.
24. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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the approach of the positivists and then turn to the ethicists'. In the end, of
course, the positivists' approach is worth nothing unless it can be defended on
ethical grounds.
We ultimately suggest that the two approaches focus on largely separable is-
sues. The ethicists' approach should not be used to choose projects with a
lower-than-market rate of return, and the positivists' approach should not be
used to abdicate obligations to the future. We suspect that the intuitions behind
the ethicists' arguments turn on a conflation of discounting welfare with dis-
counting money. The ethicists are correct to say that the welfare of a person
born in 2050 does not matter less than the welfare of a person born in 2olo. But
as we shall see, they are wrong to suggest that this claim makes it unacceptable
to discount money.
A. The Positivist Position
The positivists approach the issue as a simple problem of opportunity costs,
even for the long term.2 5 Suppose that we were going to invest s1oo billion to
reduce carbon emissions, producing a benefit of $400 billion in ioo years. This
represents a rate of return of 1.4%, the discount rate used in the Stern Review.
The positivists reason that if the market rate of return over that time period is
5.5% (the Nordhaus rate), the same soo billion could be invested to produce
over $21 trillion in ioo years, almost 53 times as much. Equivalently, we could
provide future generations with $400 billion dollars by investing about $2 bil-
lion at the market rate, keeping the remaining $98 billion to spend on riotous
living now. It does not make any sense, argue the positivists, to invest the sioo
billion to reduce the effects of climate change under this hypothetical set of
facts. To do so would be to throw away vast resources: either $98 billion today
or more than $20 trillion in ioo years.
The conclusion, following this logic, is that it is not sensible to invest in any
project unless it yields a return at least equal to the return available elsewhere.
The problem is exactly parallel to that of the individual who compared the re-
turn on an investment project to the return available elsewhere (the bank). The
long time horizon does not change the method of analysis; it only makes the
issue more important. We should, therefore, discount projects at the otherwise
available return: the market rate of return. Only projects that pass discounted
cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken. Any other choice wastes resources,
which harms future generations. In our example, instead of investing the sioo
billion in the project with a 1.4% return, we could invest, say, $5 billion in the
market and give future generations about $1 trillion. Everyone would be better
25. See, e.g., Arrow, Discounting and Public Investment Criteria, supra note 7; Kenneth
J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment
Decisions, 60 AM. EcoN. REV. 364 (1970); David Bradford, Constraints on Govern-
ment Investment Opportunities and the Choice of the Discount Rate, 65 AM. EcoN.
REV. 887 (1975); Robert Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues, supra note 7; Stephen
A. Marglin, The Opportunity Costs of Public Investment, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 274 (1963).
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off; the current generation would have $95 billion more than otherwise, and the
future ones would have $600 billion more than otherwise.
Note that the positivists are discounting money and argue that they are
treating lives at different times equally. For example, suppose that a statistical
life today has a value of $5 million.26 This is the amount we would be willing to
spend to save a life immediately. The positivists argue that if a life in 200 years is
worth the same amount ($5 million in constant dollars), we should be willing to
put aside only the present value of that amount to save that life. They are not
discounting the lives-both are worth $5 million-but they discount the dol-
lars, because a dollar set aside today grows with the discount rate. Therefore, the
positivists believe their position firmly respects the principle of intergenera-
tional neutrality and thus is defensible on ethical grounds. The claim is that fu-
ture generations are helped, not hurt, by discounting, because it ensures that
resources will be invested to yield the highest possible return.
B. Complications and Difficulties
This simple analysis runs into several complications.
1. Private and Social Rates of Return
A number of technical issues must be addressed when computing the op-
portunity cost. One important issue focuses on how to adjust for taxes and
similar items that drive a wedge between the rates of return investors realize
(the after-tax rate of return) and the rate of return that benefits society (the full,
pre-tax rate of return that includes investors' gains and the government's tax
revenue). Another problem is that there are many market rates of interest.
Treasuries pay a different rate from corporate securities; short-term bonds pay a
different rate from long-term bonds; and stocks and bonds have different re-
turns. While important, these issues are largely technical and need not detain us
here."
2. Uncertainty
A seemingly technical issue, very much worthy of attention, involves the
effect of uncertainty on discount rates. Suppose that we are considering a pro-
ject that produces a return of $1 million in 50 years. In addition, suppose that
the discount rate is uncertain and can take one of two values: 10% or 2% with
equal probability. What is the expected discount rate we should use in evaluat-
26. This number is close to current approximations. See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing
Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 387 (2004) (noting a figure of $6.1
million for the statistical value of a human life).
27. This is not to say that the issues are not important. Because small changes in the
discount rate can have large effects on project valuation, it is very important to get
these issues right. They are, however, not central to our discussion.
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ing this return? It turns out not to be the simple average of lo% and 2%, i.e., 6%.
Instead, the number is far lower-in this case, around 3.4%. The reason is that,
in order to determine the expected discount rate, we first need to take the dis-
counted value of the si million in each of the two scenarios and then average
these results. If the discount rate is 1O%, the present value is about $8500
($1,ooo,ooo/1.1o°). If the discount rate is only 2%, the present value is approxi-
mately $372,000 ($1,000,ooo/1.o250). The average of these two values is about
$190,ooo. This average is the proper number we should use for our estimate of
the present value of the project. The implied discount rate, i.e., the discount rate
that yields a present value of $19o,ooo from si million as $19o,ooo, is roughly
3.4%. As uncertainty increases and as the length of time increases, the effect is
magnified.
This point has serious implications for the problem of climate change,
which is the paradigmatic case of a long-term problem with uncertain effects."
This means that the discount rate used by the positivists should be near the very
lowest expected rate of return over the long run. If an agency uses a high rate, or
averages the high and the low values, its action should be legally vulnerable on
the grounds that it has acted arbitrarily. For example, even if we fully expect
growth rates over the next ioo years to be three or four (or more) percent, there
will be a possibility that growth rates turn out to be very low. We should dis-
count at the low rates because the bad states of the world-where growth is very
low-will dominate the averaging process. Therefore, we should not mistake
the high observed rate of return on investments for implying that the positivists'
logic recommends a high discount rate. Indeed, given that climate change itself
might lower the rate of return on investments dramatically, the discount rate
recommended by the positivists might be extremely low. This would be true
even if very negative climate consequences are unlikely, because the averaging
effect just illustrated means that adverse outcomes, even if unlikely, dominate
the analysis.
3. The Richer Future
Positivists also have to ensure that they attach the correct values to future
goods. 9 For example, if future people are richer than those alive today, they
may value the environment more than people do today. (It is a well-known fact
that people value the environment more as they get richer.) Moreover, if cli-
mate change damages the environment (as expected), the benefits the environ-
ment provides will be scarcer, and its relative value increased. Estimating cor-
rect values for the environment in the far distant future will not be easy. But
unless we are careful to take into account these sorts of considerations, we risk
using the wrong valuations and calculating the costs and benefits of climate
change abatement incorrectly.
28. See, e.g., Weitzman, Lowest Possible Rate, supra note 7.
29. See STERNER & PERSSON, supra note 7, at 6-8.
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C. The Ethicists' Position
The ethicists argue that the only way to determine the correct discount rate
is to return to first principles of ethical reasoning? Their central argument is
that cost-benefit analysis with discounting can result in dearly unethical
choices. Climate change provides the most vivid example. Climate change ex-
poses the future to the risks of terrible harm. Because of the high discount rates
required by the positivists' approach, however, we may be willing to spend only
a very small amount today to prevent these serious harms in the future. If we
respect a principle of intergenerational neutrality and believe that we have an
ethical obligation to take the interests of members of future generations seri-
ously, this position is unjustifiable. Discounting cannot validate refusing to
spend small amounts to prevent causing the risk of terrible harm to others.
To be more concrete, suppose that sea level rise will destroy Florida in 200
years. Suppose further that these effects will be extremely difficult to counteract:
Reducing emissions may be extraordinarily expensive, and mitigating the re-
sulting harm not feasible. The rate of return on climate change projects under
these assumptions is low, and cost-benefit analysis using the market return as a
discount rate might recommend that very little be done. This, however, says
nothing about whether we are behaving justly toward our descendants. We
may, under a variety of ethical theories, owe them prevention of or compensa-
tion for this harm. Under a deontological approach with a Rawlsian foundation,
for example, the generation in which one finds oneself is irrelevant from the
moral point of view; the current generation therefore violates its moral obliga-
tions if it enriches itself while subjecting future generations to catastrophic
harm.3' Under a welfarist approach, the question is whether the actions of the
current generation increase or decrease overall welfare; it is easily imaginable
that a failure to take certain actions to prevent climate change could cause a far
greater welfare loss (to all generations taken as a whole) than would those ac-
tions themselves. The positivists' theory of discounting has nothing to say about
the obligations of the current generations. In short, choosing projects solely
through cost-benefit analysis with discounting can result in serious injustice
and may violate our ethical obligations to the future.
By examining the details of discounting, the ethicists show why it produces
what seem to be obviously unethical results. They offer three central reasons.
1. Private Versus Social Rates of Return
The ethicists argue that the rate of return on an investment realized by in-
dividuals-the so-called private rate of return-is not the same as the benefit
society derives from that investment-the social rate of return. There could be
30. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 3; Dasgupta et al., supra note 7; Heal, Discounting, su-
pra note 7.
31. For a discussion of the just savings principle, see RAwLs, supra note 12, at 251-58.
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many reasons for this difference. But unless markets are perfectly competitive, a
condition that is unlikely to hold, the two rates will not be equal. Observed in-
terest rates reflect only private rates of return and, therefore, they are not good
guides to whether the total, social benefits from an investment are worth the
costs.
To illustrate using the discount rates discussed above, individuals may de-
mand a 5.5% rate of return on investments, but they see only their private bene-
fits. The social benefits of an investment may be much greater. If individuals re-
ceive, for example, a 1.4% benefit, then the additional benefits to society from an
investment may make it worthwhile. Looking only to the market rate (5.5%)
would mean that we reject projects that are overall worthwhile. Absent very
stringent conditions, such as the economist's imaginary perfect market, the pri-
vate and social benefits will not be equal, so we cannot look to the private re-
turns available in the market as a guide for social policy.
2. Individuals Neglecting Posterity
Second (and closely related to the first argument), individuals determine
today's interest rate by deciding how much to save for the future. In making
this decision, individuals consider their lifetime consumption-how much to
consume today compared to their retirement-and possibly the consumption
of their children and grandchildren. Climate change, however, is a problem that
will last many hundreds of years, spanning multiple generations. Individuals,
the ethicists claim, are simply not thinking about the distant future when mak-
ing savings decisions. This means that observed interest rates are not a good
benchmark for decisions over very long time periods. Individuals, in setting the
market rate of return, are simply not considering the relevant question.
3. Changing Rates of Return
Finally, climate change abatement will involve large adjustments to the
economy. If we make these adjustments, rates of return are likely to change.
That is, the rate of return to investments is endogenous to the problem, not
something that is external to it. The rate of return is a variable we choose rather
than a variable we observe. To make this choice, we have to be explicit about
the reasons; we have to go back to ethics.
Starting from scratch to determine the appropriate discount rate, the ethi-
cists conduct a social thought experiment. Here the relevant claims become
somewhat technical, and to understand them we have to introduce a little math.
Imagine that we are considering investing an additional dollar today that will
produce returns in the future. How much must that return in the future be to
compensate for the reduction of consumption today? The difference-how
much the future must get if the present loses a dollar-is based on our ethical
judgments about how much each generation deserves. The "social discount
rate" captures this net increase in consumption. Thus, if we must sacrifice one
446
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unit today, and society would demand i + p in the future to offset this loss, p is
the discount rate.
The ethicists assume that society determines the answer to this question by
maximizing the sum of the welfare of each generation, possibly discounting for
time. That is, in symbols, society wants to find:
Max [W(Co) + W(C) / (i + ) + W(C ) /(i+ )2...
where 6 is the rate at which we discount the welfare of future generations, if at
all, and W(C) is a measure of the welfare of a given generation, Ci being the
consumption of that generation.
The ethicists then make one additional special assumption. They assume
that the welfare of each generation is determined by a very particular form: As
consumption goes up, the marginal benefit of additional consumption (in per-
centage terms) goes down at a constant rate, ?1. In particular, the welfare of a
given generation (W) is set equal to d' 'I) / (i - i/). This form is chosen largely
for mathematical convenience rather than its basis in any empirical or ethical
support.32
With these two very specialized assumptions-that society uses a particular
function to choose how to distribute wealth across generations and that it
weighs each generation using a specialized functional form which happens to be
simple to use for calculations-and some simple math, the ethicists derive the
following as an expression for the social discount rate:
p = 16 +3
The explanation of this formula is straightforward. As discussed, p is the
social discount rate-the rate we use to evaluate projects such as climate change
abatement. The term 6 is the rate of growth of the economy. It tells us what
consumption levels are in each period, i.e., the Cs in the formula. The variable I/
reflects how much we care about inequality. That is, suppose that growth rates
are high, so that the future is significantly richer than today. The value of ? tells
us that incremental consumption in the future matters less because future gen-
erations are richer. The higher q is, the more we demand the future receives to
give up a unit of consumption today. We can think of it as an inequality
parameter.
The second term 6 is the rate at which we discount future generations. The
ethicists call it the "pure rate of time preference." It reflects a lower evaluation
of future generations simply because they are distant from us. Most of the aca-
32. This simplification is simply astonishing. Stern, for example, severely criticizes the
positivists for requiring all kinds of specialized assumptions for the private rate of
return to equal the social rate of return but then imposes specialized functional
forms in his analysis. STERN, supra note 3, at 49-61. Although the use of this func-
tional form has a long history in public economics, it remains a specialized
assumption. See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, 2 J.
ECON. THEORY 244, 251 (1970).
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demic discussion has focused on 6. The ethicists almost uniformly take the posi-
tion that it is unethical to allow positive values of 6, because this would mean
giving less weight to a future person simply because she lives in the future. 3 If
all people count equally, 6 must be zero.
The variable i/ is also important. It reflects views about inequality, both
across generations and within any given generation; higher Is are more egalitar-
ian. In the climate change context, the more egalitarian we are, the higher the
discount rate and the less we should be willing to invest in abatement. If we use
the same values for redistribution within the current generation as we do across
time, the more we want to redistribute now, i.e., we are more egalitarian, and
the higher the discount rate should be (we should want to engage in climate
change abatement less because it redistributes toward the richer future). This
seeming paradox, that strong egalitarians should care less about the future,
arises because the future is expected (one hopes) to be richer than today.
The terminology in the debate, at this point,becomes a little confusing. Set-
ting 6 equal to zero is often described as not discounting. In a sense this is cor-
rect: Future generations' welfare is not discounted merely because they are in
the future. The pure rate of time preference is zero. The social rate of discount,
p, however, will be positive. But this, the ethicists say, is not because we are dis-
counting. It is because we have distributive preferences; to the extent that future
generations are richer, we should not want to increase their consumption as
much. If p is positive, however, there will be a mathematical procedure used in
evaluating climate change that is identical to discounting. The procedure, how-
ever, is about adjusting for distributive preferences, not time. It resembles dis-
counting only by coincidence.
Once we have had our ethical debates about the parameters (and made
good technical estimates of the growth rate, e), we can determine the social dis-
count rate. Stern, in his initial report, set 6 = 0.1, q = 1, and estimated the
growth rate as 1.3%. Therefore, he used a social discount rate of 1.4%. Note that
this is well below the rate of return available for investments in the economy.
He has recently modified his views, adjusting ?/up to 2, so that the discount rate
would be 2.7%, which is closer to, but still below, the rate of return on other in-
vestments, although he has not recomputed the resulting policy recommenda-
33. See generally JOHN BROOME, COUNTING THE COST OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992);
HARROD, supra note 21; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); A.C.
PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1938); STERNER & PERSSON, supra
note 7; Broome, supra note 7; Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Dis-
count Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144 (Peter Las-
lett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992); Dasgupta, supra note 3; Heal, Intertemporal
Welfare Economics and the Environment, supra note 7; Ramsey, supra note 2o;
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Dis-
counting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941 (1999).
34. STERN, supra note 3, at 49-61.
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tions3 5 Nordhaus would set 6 = 1.5, 17 = 2, and include a growth rate of 2% to
derive a discount rate equal to 5.5%.36 The difference in conclusions from using
these different discount rates is, as noted, dramatic, shifting the policy recom-
mendation from among the most conservative to the most aggressive.
III. THE ETHICS OF DISCOUNTING
In this Part, we attempt to defend three conclusions: (1) the ethicists are
correct to insist that choosing projects solely through cost-benefit analysis with
discounting can result in serious injustice to the future and that we must respect
the principle of intergenerational neutrality; (2) the positivists are correct that
choosing any project that has a lower rate of return than the market rate wastes
resources; and (3) notwithstanding the long debate between these two positions,
they are not fundamentally inconsistent. The ethicists' insistence on intergen-
erational neutrality does not justify rejecting discounting at the market rate of
return (properly taking uncertainty into account). As we shall soon see, choos-
ing our overall legacy to the future-how much each generation receives-is to
a large extent unrelated to the choice of particular projects.
In particular, the ethicists' concern over the effects of climate change sug-
gests that we need to do more for the future but says nothing about what in par-
ticular that action should be. The positivists' use of the market rate of discount
to choose projects says nothing about whether we are fulfilling our obligations
to the future.
A. Our Central Claim
To illustrate how the two issues can be separated, imagine that the current
generation is leaving a given legacy for the future, a legacy that for now we
imagine to be the ethically justified amount. In monetary equivalents, let it be
$10o. 37 Suppose also that a new project is being considered that costs the current
generation $io and produces $20 for the future. If we engage in this project, we
can reduce our legacy elsewhere, still leaving soo for the future, thereby main-
taining distributional neutrality. The only question in this case is whether
spending the sio on this project produces a higher return than spending the sio
elsewhere. The correct procedure for deciding whether to engage in this project
35. Stern, supra note 6, at 23.
36. NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 61.
37. Imagine putting as many zeroes at the end as needed, and we recognize that some
consider the goods at stake to be incommensurable, a point to which we shall re-
turn.
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is to measure the opportunity costs, which, as we showed above, is equivalent to
discounting s
Now suppose that we discover our legacy to the future is inadequate be-
cause of newfound environmental harms from our actions. Imagine, for exam-
ple, we discover that the legacy is only $70 instead of $1oo. We must now re-
evaluate whether we are leaving enough for later generations. If we believe that,
given this information, the correct amount to leave to the future is $95, we must
increase our legacy.39 We should do so in a way that costs us least, which means
considering the opportunity costs of alternative projects. If we can find a project
that costs us only sio and leaves $25 for the future, we should not engage in pro-
jects that cost more.4° The market rate of return measures the returns from cur-
rently available projects, so as an initial matter, the market rate is a measure of
the opportunity costs of this choice. Once again, therefore, we should discount
at the market rate to choose projects. Project choice and ethical obligations to
the future are, to a large extent, separate.
Viewed this way, the ethicists' criticism of the positivists' opportunity cost
argument is simply irrelevant. It does not matter whether the current market
rates of interest are ethically correct, because they still represent the opportunity
costs of investment. Recall the numbers used above. If we could invest $1oo bil-
lion to produce $40o billion of benefits in ioo years when the market rate is
5.5%, we could equivalently invest only $2 billion to produce those same bene-
fits.
The ethicists argue that the 1.4% rate of return on the $1oo billion (to pro-
duce $40o billion) is good enough once we consider the ethical arguments. That
is, ethical considerations show that society should make investments not only
with a 5.5% rate of return but also with a 1.4% rate of return. But given that there
are hundreds or thousands of investment choices, if we are going to make in-
vestments at less than the 5.5% rate, we should start with those with the highest
return. That is, at least initially, the opportunity cost is 5.5%. If we make enough
investments to exhaust the opportunities at this rate of return, we can begin
moving down the scale, but in no case should we pursue investments with very
low rates of return as a first option.
Another way to describe the problem with the ethicists' approach is that if
the correct social discount rate is 1.4%, we should be saving vastly more than we
do today to leave the ethically appropriate legacy for the future. The exact
38. See supra Section I.A. If it turns out that the project is desirable, i.e., that current
projects have lower rates of return, there is an issue about how to divide the sur-
plus (although any division makes both generations better off).
39. We use $95 rather than $lOO because the newly discovered environmental harm
means that we (all generations together) are not as well off as we previously
thought. It is as if we lost money, and all generations likely will need to share in
this loss. The number is only illustrative, and we take no position on whether it
should be more or less than $1oo because of the damages from climate change.
40. This is a simplification of the idea of distribution-neutral investment choice. See,
e.g., Kaplow, supra note 7, at 82; Samida & Weisbach, supra note 7, at 146.
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implied savings rate is contested, because the calculation involves estimates of
technological change and other factors. But the ethicists seem to demand be-
havior from individuals that is far outside anything ever observed. As a first-
order matter, therefore, the ethicists should not be arguing about discount rates
for climate change. They should be arguing that overall savings and investment
rates must dramatically increase. Given the dramatically increased savings and
investment rates, we could decide whether investments in climate change
abatement make sense.
This point is central: The ethicists' argument is that we are leaving an insuf-
ficient amount for the future given current policies. On certain assumptions
about the effects of current decisions on the future, these arguments are correct.
But regardless of whether they are, this point says nothing about the particular
choice of projects or policies. If we are going to increase the amount we leave for
the future, it is incumbent on us not to do so in a way that wastes resources.
Therefore, even if the ethicists' argument is entirely correct, we still must care-




The positivists, however, also make a mistake. As we noted, using a market
discount rate (properly adjusted for uncertainty) is not a reason for failing to
discharge our obligations to the future. The underlying intuition behind the
ethicists' argument is that current policies threaten to impoverish the future or
to reduce its welfare greatly (as climate change threatens to do). If this is true,
discounting is not a reason to permit this occurrence. It is simply a method for
choosing projects that fulfill our obligations to prevent this from happening. A
recommendation for modest climate change abatement, such as that made by
Nordhaus, may also require other projects that ensure the proper intergenera-
tional distribution of welfare. That is, the ethicists may very well be correct that
we need to adjust the amounts we are leaving for the future in light of our new
understanding of the effects of climate change, while the positivists are correct
that in doing so, we must be sure to pick those projects with the highest rates of
return. Climate change abatement, beyond that suggested by Nordhaus, would
be justified if and only if it counts as such a project.
41. An alternative, slightly more controversial way to make this point is that the ethi-
cists observe that the private rate of return is not equal to the social rate of return
and suggest that the government can fill this gap. For example, if the private mar-
ket rejects a project if the rate of return is only, say, 5% when it demands a 5.5% re-
turn, the government should engage in the project if the social rate of return is
lower, such as the 1.4% figure used by Stern. Given large differences in the private
and social rates of return, the government would be engaging in a vastly greater
number of projects than any democratic government currently does. There are
likely to be good reasons for restricting the scope of government projects, how-
ever. Therefore, the ethicists' arguments for a very low social discount rate are in-
complete. Recommendations about government projects using a low social dis-
count rate need to be combined with these reasons for restricting the scope of
government projects. The models run by the ethicists and their resulting recom-
mendations, however, never include these exogenous restrictions.
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B. Objections
We consider here three objections to our claim that the positions of the
ethicists and positivists address separate issues.
1. The Link Between the Market Rate of Return and Overall Savings
Rates
The ethicists might object that our claimed separation between the market
rate of return and our ethical obligations to the future is misguided. The reason
is that, if we were to save more, market rates would decrease. When we finally
are saving the right amount, the market rate will be the rate prescribed by their
ethical arguments. Therefore, we might as well choose projects with that rate of
return.
42
While we agree that there is a likely connection between overall savings
rates and the market rate of return, the ethicists' conclusion does not follow. If
the market rate of return is, say, 5.5%, and the ethicists argue that at the correct
savings rate the rate of return should be 1.4%, we should not immediately un-
dertake projects with such low rates of return because eventually, if we increase
savings enough, market rates of return might become this low. Large adjust-
ments to our legacy to the future are difficult, and their success unclear. We
should begin by choosing high-return projects, not low-return projects.
Moreover, it is probably wrong to suggest that if we sufficiently increase
our savings, the interest rate will equal the one determined by the ethicists' in-
tuitions. The basic macroeconomic model used by the ethicists to derive their
equilibrium market rate of return is the Ramsey model, an almost ioo-year-old
conception that has been supplanted by vastly more sophisticated models.43
Even the most rigorous, modern models cannot compute equilibrium interest
rates when there are large-scale changes to the economy, such as a vast increase
in savings. It does not seem wise to make decisions by relying on an outdated
model to argue for committing potentially trillions of dollars to a project on the
theory that, in the eventual equilibrium predicted by that model, the project
choice will seem sensible.
A better approach is to consider more directly the nature of our ethical ob-
ligations to the future. If the obligations are to leave more than we previously
thought (say, because of newly discovered risks from climate change), we need
42. A more subtle (and less powerful) objection is that even if overall savings rates
stay the same, interest rates may fluctuate with a change in projects. For example,
if we keep our legacy to the future at sioo but change the mix of projects that
make up this value, market rates of return may change. This concern seems sec-
ond-order, as interest rates could move in either direction. See Kaplow, supra note
7, at 111-12.
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to decide how to do that. The first choice of projects as we begin this adjust-
ment should be those with the highest rates of return. This means discounting
at the market rate. As market returns adjust (by falling if the model used by the
ethicists is correct), the opportunity cost of new projects goes down.
2. Feasibility
While in theory the ethicists' and positivists' positions can be reconciled,
the most difficult problems for both are potentially ones of feasibility. We start
with the feasibility problems of the ethicists' position and then turn to the prob-
lems with the positivists' position.
The ethicists derive a discount rate to be used by a social planner independ-
ent of the rates demanded by individuals. That is, they begin with the basic
premise that social and private rates of return are different and that the gov-
ernment should choose projects using the social rate of return. The problem
with framing the question in this way is that individuals, not the government,
control most of the wealth in society. This means that whatever their prefer-
ences about savings, even if wrong, individuals can offset whatever the govern-
ment does. Suppose, for example, that individuals (taken collectively) wish to
leave $1oo for the future and are doing so now. On the basis of the ethicists'
recommendation, the government invests in a new project that leaves $40 for
the future. Individuals observing this project can simply reduce their legacy to
$6o and keep the total at sioo, frustrating the government's attempt to correct
the market. If individuals can make these adjustments, the question the ethicists
start with is simply the wrong question, because the government is not actually
making the hypothesized choice. Instead, the government merely chooses which
projects will be included in the total amount left for the future.
This type of behavior is known in the economics literature as Ricardian
equivalence. The extent to which individuals behave this way is highly con-
tested, and no one side is likely to be completely correct. 44 Individuals may,
using our numbers, reduce their legacy to only $70, or $8o, or even $9o. Never-
theless, there is a basic futility problem with the ethicists' approach. The ques-
tion they pose, by imagining that the government makes the basic choices about
total investment, ignores the basic (and well-founded) constraints on govern-
ment activity.
The positivists also encounter feasibility problems. Specifically, it may not
be possible to transfer resources across centuries to compensate the future vic-
tims of climate change. We are, when it comes to climate change, like Robinson
Crusoe-the choices are simply about distribution because there is no "bank."
There is no other way of shifting resources across these long periods of time.
44. For a review of this debate, see Kent Smetters, Ricardian Equivalence: Long-Run
Leviathan, 73 J. PUB. ECON. 395 (1999).
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This argument has been made most convincingly by Robert Lind.45 He ar-
gues that we simply do not have direct methods of shifting resources across long
periods of time, so indirect methods-for example, the choice of projects in-
cluding climate change abatement-have unavoidable distributional conse-
quences. He discusses a hypothetical proposal to transfer resources to the dis-
tant future through an investment with a 0% rate of return at a time when
money or other projects earn a 1o% return:
The preferred decision may well be to make that investment and
transfer the resources to the future generation even though it earns a
zero rate of return. At this point an eager graduate student jumps up,
sensing an economic slam dunk, and says "That was a really dumb de-
cision. You could have invested that money at lO% and made those
people a lot better off." Wrong! We don't know how to set aside in-
vestment funds and to commit intervening generations to investing
and reinvesting those funds for eventual delivery as consumer goods to
the generation 200 years from now. 46
The extent to which this is correct is an empirical and institutional question
rather than a purely ethical one. We cannot rule out the possibility that projects
with very low rates of return are the best way of shifting resources across time,
but it seems unlikely. If, for example, the market rate of return were really 10%,
and the project under consideration had a 0% rate of return, it is hard to imag-
ine that no other projects existed that, while perhaps not yielding the full lO%,
had some positive rate of return.
As in the quotation above, the claim that we cannot set aside funds for the
future is often based on the problem of intervening generations. Suppose that a
project, such as climate change abatement, will pay off in the long-distant
future, say, iOO to 200 years. If we try to set aside funds for those same future
individuals on the theory that the conserved funds will have a greater future
value than funds invested in reducing emissions, those resources would have to
pass through many generations before the target population receives them. Any
of those intervening generations could prevent transfers to the future, making it
impossible to guarantee that the funds will be used as intended.
Note, however, that the same problem arises with climate change abate-
ment. Even if we spend vast resources reducing carbon emissions, future gen-
erations can always revert to burning fossil fuels. It is hard, without much more
institutional detail, to understand why various projects would differentially im-
plicate the problem of intervening generations, which is what is needed for the
claim to have force. We cannot rule out this possibility, but it seems to us to be
extremely unlikely.
At the end of the day, which way do the feasibility issues cut? We do not
think that feasibility concerns seriously undermine the case for choosing the
45. See Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Discounting, supra note 7; Lind, A Primer
on the Major Issues, supra note 7.
46. Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Discounting, supra note 7, at 176.
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best projects, which means using market discount rates. On the other hand, it
seems clear that the very high savings rates suggested by the ethicists' approach
are unrealistic. At the same time, as we learn more about climate change, it is
becoming apparent that our legacy to the future may fall short of expectations.
New understandings about climate change increase our need and responsibility
to save, whether through investments in abatement or alternative projects. The
ethicists' imperative is becoming more important. The best approach, however,
is to help the public gain an understanding that our legacy is likely to be lower
than we might have hoped unless we let the market aggregate preferences to the
future with this new information incorporated.
3. Incommensurable Goods: Lives Versus Money
A final argument that we cannot separate our ethical obligations from pro-
ject choice is that climate change produces particular future harms that cannot
be offset by projects that benefit the future in other ways. This argument may
take a variety of forms. One version is that the deaths caused by climate change
cannot be counterbalanced by simply saving more. Dean Richard Revesz makes
such an argument. 47 He contends that the primary reason for discounting
monetary benefits does not apply to risks to life and health. Money is dis-
counted because it can be invested. But human lives cannot be invested, and a
life lost twenty or two hundred years in the future cannot be "recovered" by in-
vesting some sum in the present.
Revesz is correct to state that lives cannot be invested, but the problem with
his argument is that what is being discounted is money, not lives. Under the
standard analysis, any discount rate applies to willingness to pay to reduce sta-
tistical risks, which is a monetary measure. 4' The issues raised by the monetary
valuation of lives are no different when used for standard cost-benefit analysis
within a single time period than when used over differing time periods. Once
lives (or more properly, statistical risks of mortality) are converted to monetary
equivalents, all of the arguments discussed above concerning discounting apply.
If a life today and a life in 200 years are both "worth" the same amount in terms
of money, we should discount the dollars allocated to the future life, because
money set aside for the future grows. For example, if a life today and a life in
200 years are both worth $5 million, we should only allocate the present value of
$5 million to the future life. Anything more than $5 million values the future life
more than the present one. To be sure, translating lives into money is not easy
and raises a host of thorny questions, 49 but it is not an issue for discounting in
particular; objections to the methodologies for valuing lives are orthogonal to
the discounting debate.
47. Revesz, supra note 33, at 974.
48. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1994).
49. For further discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 26, at 386-94.
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An alternative version of the incommensurability argument, associated
with Derek Parfit, is that, even if discounting combined with changes in overall
savings rates produces the correct allocation of resources across generations
taken as a whole, harms to particular individuals cannot be offset by this proce-
dure."o Parfit imagines activities today that increase the risk of genetic deformi-
ties in a small number of individuals in the future. Overall changes to the allo-
cation of resources across generations do not compensate those individuals.
In a sense Parfit is right, but just as with the problem of valuing lives, his
argument is not really about discounting. A project that takes place entirely
within a single time period may still impose risks on individuals. Before the
project begins, all individuals may be subject to the same risk and, taken as a
whole, the project may seem sensible. Particular individuals, however, will suf-
fer harms ex post, and those who gain from the project may not be able to
compensate those who lose. The arguments surrounding this problem have
been debated vigorously.51 They present nothing new when the project occurs
over more than one time period.
CONCLUSION
In one sense, the debate over climate change is over. A consensus has
emerged not only on the existence of global warming,52 but also on the proposi-
tion that the world would benefit, on balance, from a suitably designed agree-
ment to control emissions." As yet, there is no consensus on what the agree-
ment should require. One of the most significant arguments involves the
aggressiveness of emissions cuts. That dispute turns, in large part, on the
appropriate discount rate.5 4
Our minimal goal here has been to illuminate the debate-to show exactly
what is dividing the two sides. Because of the problem of uncertainty, we have
argued for a low interest rate. But we also have contended that, on the most
fundamental question, the positivists are largely correct. Projects, including
those involving climate change, should be evaluated by discounting the costs
and benefits at the market rate of return, properly adjusted for uncertainty and
for the inherent value of the environment. Any other approach risks choosing
projects with low rates of return, which leaves resources on the table, as it were.
Discounting, however, should be seen only as a method for choosing pro-
jects, not as a method for determining our ethical obligations to the future. We
have endorsed a principle of intergenerational neutrality, and if, because of cli-
50. See PARFIT, supra note 33, at 483.
51. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 48; Sunstein, supra note 26.
52. See, e.g., HOUGHTON, supra note I, at xxvii.
53. See, e.g., NORDHAUS, supra note 3.
54. Another important issue involves the weight accorded to catastrophic outcomes.
See Weitzman, supra note 9.
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mate change, the legacy to our descendents is far lower than we imagined, we
have a moral obligation to adjust. The proper response is to leave them more,
not to choose projects by refusing to discount.

